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NOTES
HUSBAND AND WIFE-EXTENT TO WHICH THE COMmtON LAW
CONCEPT OF THE UNITY OF HUSBAND AND WIFE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES HAVE BEEN ABROGATED IN MINNESOTA BY THE MARRIED
WTOMEN'S ACT AND RELATED STATUTES, EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY
NECESSARY IMPLICATION.-The status of married women in general
is regarded as one of the most involved problems in private
law.' Historically the disabilities and privileges which were the
concomitants- of being a married woman were largely the result
of the common law concept of the legal unity of husband and wife.-'
1. See 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (4th ed. 1935) 520.
2. Bracton phrased it thus: ". . . virum et uxorem qui sunt quasi unica
persona, quia caro una et sanguis unus." (". ..a husband and his wife who are
as it were one person, being one flesh and one blood." Trans. by Twiss.)
4 Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (Woodbine's ed. 1922)
335, f. 429b: 6 Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (Twiss'
trans. 1883) 392-93, Lib. 5, Tract. 5, Cap. 25, f. 429b; Co. Litt. *112; 1 Bl.
Comm. *442. That the concept was not considered unqualified is evident from
Story's statement about the maxim: "Upon this principle of the union of
person in husband and wife depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and

NOTES

Economic and social changes, which have resulted in a somewhat striking metamorphosis of the wife from a home-dwelling,
glorified domestic to a person approaching "equality" with her
husband, have necessitated far-reaching statutory changes and consequent interpretations of these changes by the courts. The purpose
of this note is to examine how far the Minnesota Married Women's
Act and related statutes, and the decisions thereunder, have altered
the common law concept of the unity of husband and wife in Minnesota, either expressly or by necessary implication. 4 The common
law5 rules with respect to each section will be sketched briefly at the
beginning of that section without attempting a detailed analysis
of the historical origins or rationale of those rules.
I.

SEPARATE LEGAL ExISTENcE

A. At Common Law
As a generalization subject to the inevitable exceptions," it may
be stated that under the common law marriage made the husband
and wife one person. In the expression of Blackstone:
". .. the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or a least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protection, and
cover, she performs everything... .",,
A crucial incident of this concept determining the married woman's
status was that the wife could not sue in a law court without her
husband's consent and joinder, nor could she be sued without her
husband being joined.- This in turn resulted in a procedural difficulty as to suits between the spouses, since a husband, being sued as
disabilities which either of them acquire by or during the marriage." 3 Story,
Equity Jurisprudence (14th ed. 1918) 401. The historical bases for the rule
are presented in McCurdy. Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation,
(1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1035.
3. Now embodied in 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, c. 519.
4. The statutes, particularly 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.01, establishing
the separate legal existence of the married woman, speak very broadly and
have given rise to considerable litigation concerning their construction.
5. The common law here considered is what has been termed the "final
shape" of the common law. 2 Pollock & Maitland, The History of English
Law (2d ed. 1923) 403. The limitations of this type of treatment preclude an
exhaustive analysis of the substantive law in Minnesota with respect to each
of the sections considered below; the note concerns itself primarily with the
changes effected in the common law as a result of the statutes considered.
6. The most obvious exception was with regard to crimes of personal
vioknce between the spouses, where the perpetrator was subject to the law
as if the marriage relationship did not exist. 3 Vernier, American Family
Laws (1935) 162. See text to note 177 infra.
7. 1 Bl. Comm. ':442.
S. See Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations, (1931) § 54.
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defendant could not logically join his wife to sue as a plaintiff." In
addition to this procedural difficulty as to parties, the concept of
"oneness" itself came to be regarded as providing a substantive
basis for denying an action between spouses.' 0
Closely related to the requirement of joinder of the husband in an
action by or against the wife was the common law rule which made
the husband or wife of a party to an action incompetent to testify
on the other's behalf,1 ' and the rule that made communications between husband and wife inadmissible in evidence in the absence
of waiver.:" The latter rule, dealing with the admissibility of evidence, was historically one of privilege and should be distinguished
from the rule of incompetency, 3 dealing with the competency or
compellability of witnesses, though the courts frequently confuse
the two and legislatures deal with both in the same statutory sections.14 The basis for the rule of incompetency was the relationship
of husband and wife,' 5 while the basis for the broader rule of privileged communications was the public policy of preventing family

dissension and unhappiness and possible perjury.'

A recognized

exception to the rule of incompetency at common law was the
admission of the testimony of one spouse against the other in cases
7
of criminal acts committed by one against the other.1

B. Under Minesota Law
It is on the broad language of 2 Minn Stat. 1945, § 519.01,1 s
which in general terms established the separate legal existence of
9. See Madden, op. cit. supra note 8, at 220.
10. Phillips v. Barnet, (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 436. judge Blackburn there
said: "I was at first inclined to think, having regard to the old procedure and
form of pleas in abatement, that the reason -why the wife could not sue her
husband was a difficulty as to the parties; but I think that when one looks at
the matter more closely, the objection to the action is not merely with regard
to the parties, but a requirement of law founded upon the principle that husband and wife are one person." Id. at 438. Judge Field put it thus: "I am
of the same opinion ....
I now think it clear that the real substantial ground
why the wife cannot sue her husband, is not merely a difficulty in the procedure, but the general principle of the common law that husband and wife
are one person." Id. at 441.
11. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §§ 600, 601. 603.
12. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §§ 2227, 2242.
13. For a discussion of this distinction see (1936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 693.
694; (1940) 56 L. Q. Rev. 137.
14. E.g.. 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 595.02(1).
15. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 603.
16. See 8 id. § 2228; see (1940) 56 L. Q. Rev. 137. 138.
17. For a discussion of this point see (1943) 27 Minn. L. Rev. 205.
18. "Women shall retain the same legal existence and legal personality
after marriage as before, and every married woman shall receive the same
protection of all her rights as a woman which her husband does as a man,
including the right to appeal to the courts in her own name alone for protection or redress . ..

."

NOTES

the married woman, that the strongest contention has been made for
an interpretation that the common law concept of the unity of husband and wife has been abrogated by implication. It will be seen
that the broad construction given the statute by Mr. Justice Mitchell
in Gillespie v. Gillespie, where he said:
i
'The obvious intent and effect of these statutory provisions is to
preserve the separate legal existence of a married woman in respect to all her rights of person and property, and, to the extent
necessary to the full exercise and protection of these rights, to give
her in her own name all the remedies in the courts which she would
have if unmarried,"
has not been followed completely in later cases, particularly as it
related to the "rights of person" of the married woman.20
Two important problems which arise with respect to the present
status of a married woman are (1) her capacity to sue and be sued
without the joinder of her husband, and (2) her capacity to be a witness, involving (a) the effect on the rule of the incompetency of a
husband or wife to testify for or against the other, and (b) the
related but distinct doctrine of privileged communications between
husband and wife.
1. Capacity of Married Woman to Sue and be Sued
It is clear that to the extent that the married woman in Minnesota has certain recognized substantive rights, these rights can now
be enforced in her own name under 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.01,21
without having her husband join in the action, thus doing away with
the procedural difficulty. 2 The right to proceed individually is even
more expressly conferred by the terms of 2 Minn. Stat. 1945,
§ 540.05,23 which also gives third parties the right to sue a married
woman without joining her husband. However neither of these
sections is a clear guide to the more vexing problem of what new
substantive rights may, by the removal of the procedural barrier,
19. (1896) 64 Minn. 381, 383, 67 N. W. 206, 207. The statute as it

then read, 2 Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 5530, referred specifically to the right
of appeal to the courts by the wife for injuries "to her reputation, person,
" The present wording was
property, character, or any natural right ....
adopted in Minn. Rev. Laws 1905, § 3605.
20. How far the doctrine of the unity of husband and wife has been
abrogated with respect to the married woman's property rights, her capacity
to contract, and her liability for her torts and her crimes is considered in
;ubequent sections.
21. See statute quoted in note 18 supra.
22. Gillespie v. Gillespie, (1896) 64 Minn. 381, 67 N. W. 206.
23. "In cases where the husband, except for the marriage relation,
would not be a necessary party, a married woman may sue and be sued as if
unmarried and without joining her husband."
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have been accorded the spouses in suits inter se by the Married
Women's Act.24
Regarding the married woman's capacity to sue or be sued
by third parties without joinder of her husband, the Minnesota
court in Spencer v. St. Paul & Sioux City R. R.,2 5 permitting a
married woman to bring an action in her own name for trespass
to her land, stated broadly that:
"Obviously, the effect of this statute is to confer upon a married
woman the same absolute rights in respect to the use and enjoyment of her statutory separate property as belong to a feme sole,
and, to the extent necessary to the full exercise and protection of
such rights, she must be regarded as having a separate legal existence, distinct from and independent of her husband, and wholly
unaffected by her marriage relation." 2
The extent to which the wife may recover for injuries resulting to
other members of her family for a nuisance with respect to a home
27
owned by her is considered below.

With respect to injuries to the wife's person by third parties,
it is settled that she is allowed to sue in her own name for her injuries which are direct. 28 Such direct injuries for which she may
recover have been held to include "loss of services as a singer."" 9
Even where under the husband-wife relationship the husband would
normally be bound to pay for his wife's hospital and medical expenses, she may herself recover "for doctor's and nurse's expenses" in a suit against the tortfeasor when she assumes the
liability and pays for the expenses, 0 or "for medical services and
24. As the married woman's capacity to sue her husband has been inter-

preted differently with respect to each type of right concerned, the cases

are considered separately under the succeeding sections of this note.
25. (1875) 22 Minn. 29, 32.
26. Significantly, the decision was made over the contention that the
fact that the land was occupied by both husband and wife vested the cause
of action in the husband. This decision was not based on an interpretation of
§ 540.05, but rather, by the court's reasoning, followed as an inference from
2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.02, establishing the married woman's property
rights. This latter statute is dealt with under Section II. PROPERTY RIGHTSWIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE. See note 65 infra and text thereto.

27. See Section II. PROPERTY RIGHTs-WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE. See
note 84 infra and text thereto.
28. See Libaire v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., (1911) 113 Minn. 517,
523, 130 N. W. 8, 10 (see note 175 infra and text thereto) ; Mageau v. Great
Northern Ry., (1908) 103 Minn. 290, 291, 115 N. W. 651, 652.
29. Libaire v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., supra note 28. The court
stated that inasmuch as no interest of her husband in her earnings as a singer
appeared on the face of the complaint, any such interest should have been
asserted as an affirmative defense to her right to recover for the loss thereof.
Id. at 523, 130 N. W. at 10.
30. Fink v. Baer, (1930) 180 Minn. 433, 230 N. W. 888. See note 172
infra and text thereto.
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hospital expenses" when she is living. apart from her husband, not
being supported by him, and has alone requested the services. 31
2. Capacity of the Spouse as a Witness
The Minnesota legislature in what is now 2 Minn. Stat. 1945,
§ 595.02(1), 22 treated together the historically separate problems33 of the competency of a spouse to testify and of privileged
communications made to one another by spouses during the marriage. This statute modifies the common law position by permitting
a spouse to be examined with the consent of the other spouse in an
action involving that spouse and a third party, and by permiting
a spouse to testify without the consent of the other in suits between
the spouses. That the Minnesota court recognizes and applies the
distinction between incompetency to testify and the exclusion of
privileged communications is clear from its decision in Lockwood
v. Lockwood,34 where it held a wife competent to testify in an action
brought by her against third parties for alienation of her husband's
affections, her testimony not relating to conversations between
herself and her husband.
a. Competency of Spouse to Testify
Section 595.02(1) declares the requirement of consent inapplicable ".

.

. to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed

by one against the other ... " which provision the Minnesota court
has held to be merely declaratory of and not an extension of the
common law exception to the general rule of incompetency. 5
31. Paulos v. Koelsch, (1935) 195 Minn. 603, 263 N. XV. 913. See note
173 infra and text thereto. A fuller treatment on which of the elements of
the total damages for personal tort by a third party the wife can recover is
given under Section IV. ToaRs. See note 169 infra and text thereto.
32. "A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without
her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, nor
can either, during the marriage or afterwards, without the consent of the
other, be examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage. This exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, nor to a criminal action or proceeding

for a crime committed by one against the other nor to an action or proceeding
for abandonment and neglect of the wife or children by the husband ....

.

33. See notes 13 and 14 supra and text thereto.
34. (1897) 67 Minn. 476, 70 N. W. 784. See also Nat. German-American Bank v. Lawrence, (1889) 77 Minn. 282, 290, 79 N. XV. 1016, 80 N. W.
363, 364, where Mr. Justice Mitchell, in considering the effect of a waiver on
the issue of competency to testify, said by way of dictum, 'We do not wish
to be understood as meaning that the waiver or consent would extend to com-

munications made by one spouse to the other during the marriage, where
such communication was not a subject of inquiry in the direct examination.

Such communications stand upon a separate, if not a different, footing, and
this question is not involved in this case."
35. State v. Armstrong, (1860) 4 Minn. 335
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Thus, the court has held in State v. Armstrong" and State v.
Lasher37 that a wife cannot testify against her husband without his
consent in a prosecution for the crime of adultery, on the ground
that such testimony was not within the exception recognized at
common law. The decision in the Armstrong case was made over
the contention that adultery of the husband was a crime against
the wife within the meaning of Section 595.02(1). The court reasoned that it was not such a crime against her, since it was not
directed against her person and no violence to nor abuse of her
was involved.38
Where, however, the third party alone was charged with
adultery, the Minnesota court in State v. Vollander," permitted the
testimony of the injured husband as to the offense to be given be40
fore the grand jury.
An evidence that the court will not, without clear legislative
enactment, extend the exception allowing a spouse to testify in
cases of a crime against the other spouse appears from its decision
in State v. Frey.41 There the court on the basis of statutory construction held that a wife is not a competent witness for the state
in a prosecution against her husband for a crime against her committed before marriage, the court reasoning that the statute deals
with acts between the parties in the marriage relation, and not with
acts committed before the marriage.
b. Privileged Communications Between Spouses
The statute has been construed in favor of keeping communications privileged so as to exclude all private conversations between
husband and wife, whether they were "confidential" or not,4 2 ex36. Ibid.
37. State v. Lasher, (1915) 131 Minn. 97, 154 N. W. 735.

38. State v. Armstrong, (1860) 4 Minn. 335, 343. For a general discussion of the competency of testimony of one spouse against the other in cases
of criminal acts committed by one against the other see (1943) 27 Minn. L.

Rev. 205.

39. (1894) 57 Minn. 225, 58 N. W. 878.
40. The court negatived the objection that such a holding would lead to
discord and dissension in the family on the ground that the public policy of
this state had been declared by legislative enactment, now 2 Minn. Stat.
1945, § 617.15, providing that a complaint by the husband or wife is necessary for commencing an adultry prosecution (except when such husband or
wife is insane). It would be illogical, the court reasoned, to permit the husband
to make complaint but to exclude his evidence in support of it. But cf., State
v. Armstrong, (1860) 4 Minn. 335, 343. In State v. Lasher, (1915) 131 Minn.
97, 98, 154 N. W. 735, (see note 37 supra and text thereto) the court declared the Vollander case not in point.
41. (1899) 76 Minn. 526, 79 N. W. 518.

42. Newstrom v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry., (1895) 61 Minn. 78, 63 N. W.

253; Leppla v. Minnesota Tribune Co., (1886) 35 Minn. 310, 29 N. W. 127.
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cept where the communication from its very nature was such that
it was intended to be communicated to others.4 3 A further indication that the court construes the statute in favor of the privilege is
that the death of one spouse is held not to remove the inadmissibility
of all privileged communications. 44 That the court favors the
prohibition against communications between husband and wife
being introduced in evidence without the consent of the other
spouse is also to be inferred from its extension of the privilege to
46
45
actions for alienation of affections and for criminal conversation.
Il.

PROPERTY RIGHTS-WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE

A. At Commnon Law

47

48

By marriage a woman at common law was deprived of the right
to a separate legal estate, and, in general, her husband became
entitled to the use and enjoyment of both the property she had at the
time of the marriage and that which she acquired during coverture.4 1 In the freehold estates of the wife, whether she owned them
prior to marriage or acquired them during marriage, the husband
had an estate which endured during the marriage and their joint
lives and which he could alienate without her joinder.50 If issue were
born alive of their marriage capable of inheriting lands from the
43. See Newstrom v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry., (1895) 61 Minn. 78, 83,
63 N. W. 253, 254.
44. In re Estate of Osbon, (1939) 205 Minn. 419, 286 N. W. 306;
Beckett v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, (1897) 67 Minn. 298, 69
N. W. 923; Newstrom v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry., (1895) 61 Minn. 78, 63
N. W. 253. In the Osbon case there had also been a divorce and that fact
was held not to remove the bar to admissibility.
45. Giesdahl v. Harmon, (1928) 175 Minn. 414, 221 N. W. 639.
46. Conrad v. Peloquin, (1929) 177 Minn. 577, 226 N. W. 195.
47. The scope of this treatment of the married woman's property rights
is limited to a discussion of what incidents of ownership in regard to the
married woman's separate property are given her under her newly created
status, and does not concern itself, except incidentally, with the question
of a spouse's statutory interest in the estate of the other spouse. Estates in
dower and estates by the curtesy were abolished in Minnesota by Minn.
Gen. Laws 1875, c. 40, §§ 1, 5. A statutory interest was established in lieu
of dower or curtesy under 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 525.16. Each spouse's rights
in the homestead are also specifically governed by statute, 2 Minn. Stat. 1945,
§ 507.02, 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 525.145, and 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, c. 510, and
are not here treated, except as they bear on the question of the wife's general
capacity to convey her real estate.
48. The growth of the common law on the married woman's property
rights may be found in a treatment in Rapacz, Progress of the Property Law
Relating to Married Women, (1943) 11 U. of Kan. City L. Rev. 173. Here
we are concerned only with what that author discussed as the "final shape"
of the common law.
49. See Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations (1931), §§ 28-33.
50. See 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (4th ed. 1935) 525; 2
Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law (2d ed. 1923) 403-04.
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wife, the husband then had an estate for his life in all those lands
as tenant by the curtesy.51 This life estate was alienable without
the concurrence of the wife, 2 but the husband could not by himself
convey an estate which would outlast the marriage, or outlast his
life where he became tenant by the curtesy, for the only procedure
for alienating the fee was by a fine, to which both husband and
wife were parties and to which the wife assented after a separate
examination.5 When the husband died, his wife having predeceased
him, her heirs got the land.54 On the other hand, the wife had an
interest in her husband's separate property, which was inchoate
on marriage and became consummate on his death. This interest
was a life estate known as dower in one-third of all the lands in
which her husband, during coverture, was seized of an estate of
inheritance which any issue she might have would be capable of
inheriting.55 The husband could not alienate his land free of this
dower interest except by the device of a fine.56 From these rules, it
is apparent that the husband was not properly speaking an owner of
his wife's land but was rather a kind of profitable guardian while
the marriage lasted.57
With respect to the wife's chattels personal, however, the husband became the absolute owner, and even became the owner of her
choses in action upon reducing them to possession, providing he did
so while the marriage lasted.5 The husband could freely dispose
of these chattels inter vivos or by will 9 with the exception that the
wife's necessary clothing and paraphernalia would remain to her
(subject to his debts) unless he had disposed of them inter vivos. 6'
Chattels real, however, such as a term for years or a wardship.
occupied a somewhat middle ground; they could be freely alienated
inter vivos, but would not pass under the husband's will and would
go to the wife if the husband had not disposed of them during his
lifetime. 6
To avoid the harsh results of the common law, there developed
in the courts of equity the recognition of the married woman's
51.

See 3 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 50, at 185-86, 525; 2 Pollock

& Maitland, op. cit. supra note 50, at 404.

52. See 2 Pollock & Maitland, op. cit. supra note 50, at 404.

53. Ibid.
54.

See 3 E-oldsworth, op. cit. supra note 50, at 525.

55. Id. at 189.

56. See 2 Pollock & Mfaitland, op. cit. supra note 50, at 404.
57. See 3 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 50, at 526.
58. Id. at 526-27.
59. See 2 Pollock &Maitland, op. cit. supra note 50, at 404.

60. Id. at 405.
61.

See 3 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 50, at 527; 2 Pollock & Mait-

land, op. cit. supra, note 50, at 404.
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separate equitable estate. 62 By means of the equitable trust, the
married woman became capable of performing legal acts in relation to her separate estate and of acting as an independent party
in proceedings in chancery. 2
B.

Under Minnesota Law
64

1. In General
The existence of a separate legal estate for married women in
Minnesota is clearly spelled out in 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.02,65
and the Minnesota court in the early case of Spenwer v. St. Paid
& Sioux City R. R."6 gave the statute as broad an interpretation as
67
its language demands.
The statute, which by its terms extends the married woman's
capacity of ownership to personal and to mixed property and frees
all her property from the control of her husband, represents perhaps the biggest single gain in the movement towards legal equality
between the husband and wife. 68 Thus, the married woman's separate estate is so far recognized that where a husband with his wife's
consent, acquired possession of her separate property, in the form
of her separate earnings, it was held that the husband held such
property in trust for his wife in the absence of her intent to make a
gift. 9 Similarly, her ownership is such that her property is not sub62. See 5 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2d ed. 1937) 310-15;
6 Holdswortb. A History of English Law (2d ed. 1937) 644-48.
63. See 5 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 62, at 314.
64. For a comparison of the married woman's interests in jurisdictions
following the common law, as modified by statutes, with jurisdictions following the commurlity property system, see Kirkwood, Equality of Property
Interests Between Husband and Wife. (1924) 8 Minn. L. Rev. 579.
65. "All property, real, personal, and mixed, and all choses in action,
owned by any woman at the time of her marriage, shall continue to be her
separate property, notwithstanding such marriage; and any married woman,
during coverture, may receive, acquire, and enjoy property of every description, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and all avails of her
contracts and industry, free from the control of her husband, and from any
liability on account of his debts, as fully as if she were unmarried."
66. (1875) 22 Minn. 29, 32.
67. See quotation in text to note 26 supra. The companion case of
Wampach v. St. Paul & Sioux City R. R., (1875) 22 Minn. 34, involving the
same issues, expressly followed the Spencer case.
68. The wife's ownership of property is qualified, as is her husband's,
by the existence of the spouse's statutory rights under 2 Minn. Stat. 1945,
§ 525.16, and the requirement, under 2 Minn. Stat. 1945. §507.02, of a joint
deed for the conveyance of the real estate of either if it is to be conveyed
free of the spouse's rights therein. See also 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, §507.03.
69. In re Estate of Reifsteck, (1936) 197 Minn. 315, 267 N. W. 259.
"Where husband and wife are living together, they shall be jointly and
severally liable for all necessary household articles and supplies furnished to
and used by the family." 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.05. As to his wife, the
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ject to confiscation by the state for unauthorized misuse by her
husband -when she did not have notice, knowledge, or reason to believe that her husband intended to use such property in violation
of state game laws. 70 A husband's unauthorized mortgage of a
team of horses belonging to his wife cannot affect her ownership.-1
The property of a wife is not subject to her husband's debts.,
That the consequence of the wife's property not being liable
for the debts of her husband gives rise to an unhealthy opportunity
to defeat the rights of creditors was recognized by the court in
Hossfeldt v. Dill, 3 but regarded as inevitable. The court there upheld the lower court's submission of the question of ownership to
the jury, to decide ".

.

. upon all the testimony, whether these trans-

actions were in good faith, or a mere cover to protect the land and
the crops from the husband's creditors. ' 74 The question of true
ownership as between husband and wife where the rights of the
husband's creditors are concerned is a question of fact, to be determined upon a fair preponderance of the evidence.7 5 The ordinary principle of estoppel may operate to defeat a wife's ownership in that a wife who has acquiesced in her husband's use of her
property as his own may be estopped from asserting her ownership
against a chattel mortgagee of the property."'
husband is-still primarily liable for household necessaries when she expects
repayment of sums so expended by her. Kosanke v. Kosanke, (1917) 137
Minn. 115. 162 N. W. 1060.
70. State v. One Buick Sedan Automobile, (1943) 216 Minn. 129, 12
N. W. 2d 1.
71. , Klein v. Frerichs, (1914) 127 Minn. 177, 149 N. W. 2.
72. 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.02. See statute quoted in note 65 supra.
73. (1881) 28 Minn. 469, 472, 10 N. W. 781, 782. The court said:
"If such independent business relations of husband and wife afford unusual
facilities for fraud, by means of the pretended transfer of property from one
to the other, such consequence is necessarily incident to the enforcement of
the statutory rights conferred upon married women." Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Laib v. Brandenburg, (1885) 34 Minn. 367, 25 N. W. 803. The
problem is well stated in Kroll v. Moritz, (1910) 112 Minn. 270, 272, 127
N. W. 1120, 1121, where the court said: "Where husband and wife are living
together and maintaining a joint home, it is inevitable that each will exercise
-more or less dominion over property of which, irrespective of absolute title.
the family has the beneficial use; so that, when the question of title is presented, it is one of fact, which a jury is peculiarly well fitted to pass upon."
Ibid.
76. War Finance Corporation v. Erickson. (1927) 171 Minn. 276, 214
N. V. 45. The court stated its position thus: "The case is that of a trusting
wife who has long permitted her husband to manage as his own her property, to
hold himself out to the business world as the owner of it, and who has been
satisfied with that appearance of things- until- beset by financial reverses.
Thenr as to those who have relied upon the apparent condition of things,
it is too late for the wife to assert her separate ownership." Id. at 279-80,
214 N. W. at 47.

NOTES

2. Right to the Control and Use of and the Rents and
Profits from Her Separate Property
Necessary incidents of full and complete ownership of all property, real, personal, or mixed, are the rights to use and enjoy it
and to receive its rents and profits, all of which are granted the
married woman in Minnesota by the language of 2 Minn. Stat. 1945,
§ 519.02.77 Broad language in cases such as Spencer v. St. Paul &
Sioux City R. R.,7 S giving the wife the same absolute right to the
use and enjoyment of her separate estate as if she were sole, in
Sudbo v. Rusten°7 declaring the husband has no control over the
wife's real property during coverture and that it is entirely free
0
from liability for his debts, and in Hossfeldt v. Dill,"
holding the
wife entitled to the products from her own farm, leaves no doubt
that the ownership which the married woman enjoys of her separate property is not the sterile one it was at common law with respect to realty,5 ' but that it carries with it the normal incidents of
true ownership.
3. Right to Redress for Tort to Her Separate Property
82
by Third Persons
It was early recognized that a married woman in Minnesota
could recover in her own name for damages by third parties to her
separate property. .' That a married woman would be limited to a
recovery for the loss to her own interests only, resulting from the
creation of a nuisance with respect to the home occupied by the
family and owned by her, was indicated by the court's language in
Friburk v. Standard Oil Co. 84 However, in the subsequent case of
Alillet 11.
Minnesota Crushed Stone Co.,85 in discussing the owner's
77. See statute quoted in note 65 supra.
78. (1875) 22 Minn. 29, 32. See note 66 supra and text thereto.
79. (1896) 66 Minn. 108, 109, 68 N. W. 513, 514.
80. (1881) 28 Minn. 469, 10 N. W. 781.
81. See note 50 supra and text thereto.
82. The wife's right to recover for tort committed against her property
by her husband is considered under Section IV. TORTS. See note 140 infra
and text thereto.
83. Wampach v. St. Paul & Sioux City R. R., (1875) 22 Minn. 34;
Spencer v. St. Paul & Sioux City R. R., (1875) 22 Minn. 29. See notes 21, 23,
25, and 26 supra and text thereto.
84. (1896) 66 Minn. 277, 278-79, 68 N. W. 1090, 1091. "The fact that
she was furnishing the house in which the family resided does not change
the common-law rule that the husband is the head of the family, nor would it
give to her the right to recover for damages to the family resulting from
the nuisance. But she had a right to show the use to which she was putting
her property as bearing upon the question of her own injury." Ibid.
85. (1920) 145 Minn. 475, 177 N. W. 641.
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right to recover for any discomfort, annoyance, or illness suffered
by himself or any member of his family resulting from the nuisance,
the court said by way of dictum :",
"If the wife and mother owns the property, we are of the
opinion, notwithstanding a remark made arguendo in Friburk v.
Standard Oil Co., 66 Minn. 277, 68 N. W. 1090, that she should be
allowed the same right of recovery as the husband would have had
had he been the owner. This is not on the ground that in such case
she is to be regarded as titular head of the family, but it seems to
us to be the most practicable rule, and it avoids the necessity of more
than one action."
In denying a motion for reargument, the court pointed outs that
its language was not to be construed as vesting in one member of
a family the right to enforce an action accruing to another for
direct personal injuries, and adopted the rule of United States
Smelting Co. v. Sisam.s8
From this, it is likely that the Minnesota court will consider
the married woman's right to redress for injuries to her separate
property by third parties co-extensive with the right the husband
enjoys with respect to his property.
8
4. Capacity to Alienate Her Separate Property

With respect to personal property, there are no specific statutory limitations on the wife's capacity to alienate by sale or gift,
free from any interest of her husband, but if she dies without having
disposed of it by valid sale or gift the husband is entitled to his
statutory one-third interest under 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 525.16(1).0
86. Id. at 480, 177 N. W. at 643.
87. Id. at 480-81, 179 N. W. at 682.
88. (C.C.A. 8th 1912) 191 Fed. 293. "... the owner of a residence which
is rendered inconvenient, uncomfortable and unhealthy, as a home, by a
nuisance, may prove and recover the damages he suffers himself from the
discomfort and sickness thereby inflicted upon his wife and other members

of his family who live with him in his residence, although he may not, and

they alone may, maintain the cause of action for the direct personal
to themselves." Millet v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., (1920) 145
475, 481, 179 N. W. 682. See Eschenbach v. Benjamin, (1935) 195
378, 382, 263 N. W. 154, 156.
89. Since the capacity of both husband and wife to alienate his

injury

Minn.

Minn.
or her

separate property is now governed by statutes which treat both spouses

identically, little light would be thrown on the principal question of the extent
of the married woman's separate legal identity by a detailed discussion of
these statutes and the decisions thereunder. The basic limitations they impose
will be mentioned only to round out the picture.
90. "(1) Personal property: To the surviving spouse one-third thereof

free from any testamentary disposition thereof to which such survivor shall

not have consented in writing or by election to take under the will as provided by law...."

NOTES

With respect to real property, there are further restraints on the
power of alienating it free from the interests of the other spouse
under 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 507.02.1- It provides that the homestead cannot be mortgaged or alienated by either spouse without
the signature of the other,92 except as to a purchase money mortgage, and requires the signatures of both spouses for the conveyance
of the real estate of either, unless the conveyance or other alienation
is to be subject to the statutory interest of the surviving spouse
under 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 525.16(2) .3 The conveyance by either
spouse of his real estate directly to the other spouse is held to be
prohibited by virtue of 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.06.94

III. CONrTRACTS
A.

At Common Law

Unlike her single sister who had full contractual capacity, the
married woman at common law, with few exceptions, had no power
or capacity to contract, and any attempted contracts by her would
91.

"If the owner be married, no mortgage of the homestead, except for

purchase money unpaid thereon, nor any sale or other alienation thereof shall
be valid without the signatures of both husband and wife.
"A husband and wife, by their joint deed, may convey the real estate of
either. The husband, by his separate deed, may convey any real estate owned
by him, except the homestead, subject to the rights of his wife therein; and
the wife, by her separate deed, may convey any real estate owned by her,
except the homestead, subject to the rights of her husband therein; and either
husband or wife may, by separate conveyance, relinquish his or her rights in
the real estate so conveyed by the other. Subject to the foregoing provisions,
either husband or wife may separately appoint an attorney to sell or convey
any real estate owned by such husband or wife, or join in any conveyance
made by or for the other. The minority of the wife shall not invalidate any conveyance executed by her."
92.- For a discussion of this point see (1917) 2 Minn. L. Rev. 63.
93. "(2) Real property: To the surviving spouse an undivided one-third
of all real property of which the decedent at any time while married to
such spouse was seized or possessed, to the disposition of which by will or
otherwise such survivor shall not have consented in writing or by election to
take under the will...." 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 507.03, provides that a purchase
money mortgage executed by one spouse of an estate purchased by him during
coverture shall not be subject to inchoate or contingent rights of the other
spouse, though not joined in by such spouse.
94. Snortum v. Snortum, (1923) 155 Minn. 230, 193 N. W. 304. The
statute reads: "No contract between husband and wife relative to the
real estate of either, or any interest therein, nor any power of attorney or
other authority from the one to the other to convey real estate, or any interest
therein, shall be valid; but, in relation to all other subjects, either may be
constituted the agent of the other, or contract with the other. In all cases
where the rights of creditors or purchasers in good faith come in question.
each spouse shall be held to have notice of the contracts and debts of the
other as fully as if a party thereto." For a discussion of this point see (1933)
17 Minn. L. Rev. 233; (1929) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 612. This question is further
treated under Section III. CONTRACTS. See note 126 infra and text thereto.
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be not merely voidable but void. 5 In addition to this general incapacity of the wife to contract, her incapacity to sue and be sued
without joinder" rendered impossible contracts between husband
and wife. Further, existing obligations owed by the wife to the
husband at the time of the marriage were merged in and cancelled
by the marriage.
With respect to antenuptial contracts, however, the common
law after the Statute of Uses permitted the parties to the marriage
to make contracts by way of marriage settlements in defeat of the
normal property rights, but in general they could not vary the other
rights and obligations of husband and wife arising from the marriage status. 98

B. Under Minnesota Law
'1. The Wife's Contractswith Third Parties
a. In General
Prior to the passage of the enactment now incorporated in
2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.03,11 it was recognized in accordance with
the common law position that the married woman in Minnesota
could not bind either herself of her property generally by con00
tract.Y
Her general capacity to contract is now clearly recognized
by the provisions of Section 519.03,10" limited only with respect to
conveyances of her real estate and of the homestead. 0 2 In Sand95. See Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations (1931) § 35; Carpenter v. Leonard, (1861) 5 Minn. 155, 163. Exceptions existed at common
law where the husband had been banished, had abjured the realm, was a nonresident alien, or was under sentence of transportation or of penal servitude,
in which cases the law looked upon the husband as civilly dead and gave
the wife the right to contract. Madden, op. cit. supra, § 35. In equity the wife
could bind her equitable separate estate by contract. Madden, op. cit. supra,
§§ 39, 40, 41.
96. See note 8 supra and text thereto.
97. See 3 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th ed. 1918) 403.
98. See Madden, op. cit. supra note 95, § 71. For an analysis of the historical development of antenuptial contracts, see Ronken, Antenuptial Contracts; Their Origin and Nature, (1914) 24 Yale L. 3. 65.
99. "Every married woman is bound by her contracts and responsible
for her torts, and her property shall be liable for her debts and torts to the
same extent as if unmarried. She may make any contract which she could
make if unmarried, and shall be bound thereby, except that every conveyance
and contract for the sale of her real estate or interest therein, shall be subject to and governed by the provisions of section 507.02."
100. See Pond v. Carpenter, (1867) 12 Minn. 430, 432. The court there
held that the wife could charge her separate estate with the consent of her
husband or by order of the district court of the county under the provisions
of Minn. Rev. Stat. 1851, c. 71, § 105, but pointed out that that act did not
remove the general disability to contract imposed by coverture.
101. See statute quoted in note 99 supra.
102. These limitations are considered in text to notes 107, 127 infra.
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wichlMfg. Co. v. Zellme, 10 3 the court in construing the statute
stated :
".**the provisions . . . were radical and sweeping, and were
intended, in respect to her contracts, to invest a married woman, not
merely with the right to contract in respect to her separate property, but with all the rights and liabilities of a feme sole, save only
as expressly excepted or reserved by the same statute."
As a result of this contractual capacity, the wife who joins her
husband in a conveyance of his real estate for the purpose only of
conveying her statutory interest, must be careful of the language of
the instrument, for if she joins in the covenants, she is personally
liable on them.1" 4 Her capacity to bind herself personally is so far
recognized that she will be held personally liable if she assumes to
pay a pre-existing debt of her husband, the extension of time to'
her husband being regarded as supplying the requisite consideration.105
This general capacity of the married woman to contract with
third parties has not by implication abrogated the common law rule
of presumed agency of the wife in the purchase of necessaries, the
06
that the provisions
court having held in Flyln v. Messenger
authorizing the married woman to contract do not change the common law rule that where she is living with her husband she is presumed to have authority to act for him in supplying the ordinary
wants of the household.
b. Limitations as to Contracts Affecting Real Estate
The inability of either spouse to convey his-real estate in Minnesota free from the other spouse's statutory interest is specifically
provided for by statute, 07 and as the statutes apply equally to both
spouses, no particular light would be shed on the question of how
far the married woman's legal existence is separate by a detailed
103. (1892) 48 Minn. 408, 414, 51 N. W. 379, 380. The court there held
a married woman who joined with her husband in a mortgage of real estate
and expressly became a party to the covenants therein was bound by the
covenants as if unmarried.
104. Security Bank of Minnesota v. Holmes, (1897) 68 Minn. 538, 71
N. W. 699; Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. Zellmer, (1892) 48 Minn. 408, 51 N. W.
379. In a subsequent case involving a fraudulent contract for deed by a
husband and his wife to the plaintiff, it was held that the wife would not be
liable for the purchase price on rescission on the reasoning that the only
purpose of her signing was to bar her statutory right. McDermott v. Ralich,
(1933) 188 Minn. 501, 247 N. W. 683.
105. First State Bank v. Hell, (1938) 202 Minn. 68, 277 N. W. 276;
O'Gara, King & Co. v. Hansing, (1903) 88 Minn. 401, 93 N. W. 307.
106. (1881) 28 Minn. 208, 9 N. W. 759.
107. See text to notes 91-94 supra for a brief discussion of the pertinent
statutes.
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analysis of the decisions under these statutes. Prior to a legislative
change in 1907 the wife was unable to convey her real estate to a
third party, even subject to her husband's interest therein, without
having her husband join in the deed.108 While the requirement of
joinder by the husband in a conveyance of the wife's real estate
was still in effect, the court in Althen v. Tarbox""" refused to construe the general language of Minn. Gen. Laws 1887, c. 207 (now
incorporated in 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.01110) declaring the
legal personal identity of the married woman as having repealed
by implication the requirement of joinder, on the ground that such
could not have been the legislative intent.
These limitations on the capacity of a spouse to convey his real
estate free from the rights of the other spouse embody the public
policy of protecting the statutory interest of each spouse against
free disposition by the other, and no disagreement can be had
with the court's application of the statutes.
2. Contracts Inter Se
a. Antenuptial Contracts
The legal capacity, developed at common law,'' in two persons
contemplating marriage to fix validly by contract the rights which
each should have in the property of the other during life, or the
rights which the survivor should have in the property after the
other spouse's decease in defeasance of the spouse's statutory share,
is established by the express language of 2 Minn. Stat. 1945,
§ 519.08112 and is recbgnized by decisions."' Such agreements are,
in fact, favored by the Minnesota court, but they will be set aside
108. Minn. Laws 1907, c. 123, § 1, substituted the provisions, now contained in 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 507.02, that ".

.

. the wife, by her separate

deed, may convey any real estate owned by her, except the homestead, subject

to the rights of her husband therein; and either husband or wife may by

separate conveyance relinquish his or her rights in the real estate so con-

veyed by the other," for provisions in Minn. Rev. Laws 1905, § 3335, that
"..the wife, by her separate deed, may relinquish her rights therein when
so conveyed, and without such conveyance she may, by separate deed or
instrument, release her dower in lands of a former deceased husband. Real
estate owned by the wife shall be conveyed only by deed in which her husband joins...."
109. (1892) 48 Minn. 18, 22, 50 N. W. 1018, 1019.
110. See statute quoted in note 18 supra.
111. See note 98 supra and text thereto.
112. "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect antenuptial
contracts or settlements." Such agreement is required to be in writing. 2
Minn. Stat. 1945, § 513.01(3) (Stat. of Frauds); 2 Minn. Stat. 1945,
§ 525.16(2) (see statute quoted in note 93 supra).
113. Appleby v. Appleby, (1907) 100 Minn. 408, 111 N. W. 305;
Desnoyer v. Jordan, (1880) 27 Minn. 295, 7 N. W. 140.
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as inequitable when the wife relies on her husband's representations
and there has not been a fair disclosure of the husband's interests at
the time of the making of the contract, 1 4 or where in view of all
the facts the wife's rights under the contract are inadequate and unconscionable. 115 Where fairly and equitably made, antenuptial contracts in anticipation of marriage exclude the operation of law in
respect to the pr6perty rights of each in so far as covered by the
contract,""6 but the capacity of parties in contemplation of marriage
to alter the legal incidents of the married status apparently remains limited to their property interests. Thus, an antenuptial agreement which would make the marriage terminable by act of the parties, or which would make it effective only for a 7limited purpose,
would be void as being contrary to public policy."
With respect, then, to the legitimate subject matter of antenuptial contracts, the general legal separateness which has been
given the married woman by the Married Women's Act has not
operated to extend the scope of the mutual rights and duties which
may legally be made the subject matter of an antenuptial contract,
since the capacity to contract collided with the notion that the
state is in effect a third party to the marriage contract, and that
public policy will not permit the legal incidents of marriage to be
altered by agreement of the parties." 8
The related question of the effect of marriage upon a contract
entered into not in contemplation of marriage arose in Archer v.
1
Moulton,"'
where the court held that a contract employing a farm
hand at a specified monthly wage was not cancelled by the marriage
of the parties, but remained a binding obligation on the wife, thereby abrogating the common law notion of merger and cancellation
of the obligation by marriage.
b. Postinuptial Contracts in General
The legal capacity of husband and wife in Minnesota to contract inter se is specifically denied as regards contracts relating to
the real estate of either, and specifically granted as to all other
114. Stanger v. Stanger, (1922) 152 Minn. 489, 189 N. W. 402. The
court reasoned that the duty of disclosure results from a confidential relationship.
115. Slingerland v. Slingerland, (1911) 115 Minn. 270, 132 N. W. 326.
116. Appleby v. Appleby, (1907) 100 Minn. 408, 111 N. W. 305.

117. See Safranski v. Safranski, (1946) 222 Minn. 358, 362, 24 N. W.
2d 834, 836.
118. For a development of this notion (with respect to postnuptial contracts) see (1946) 32 Va. L. Rev. 407.
119. (1931) 183 Minn. 306, 236 N. W. 455, (1932) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 108.
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contracts, by 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.06.120 This statutory limitation on the right of husband and wife to contract with each other,
and the judicially interposed general requirement that 'the contract
be not opposed
to public policy are brought out in Archer v.
1 21
JJouflton1.

Contracts which purport to be in satisfaction of the husband's
duty to support his wife made between them when they have no
intention of separating have been held void by most courts on the
grounds that they violate this requirement that contracts between
husband and wife conform to the general public policy of the state. 22
The Minnesota court upholds the validity of such contracts, however, where the agreement is made after separation of the parties2 3
Such agreement between the parties is not abrogated even by
subsequent divorce when the divorce decree makes no provision
for the support of the wife.12 4 However, the subject of alimony cannot be removed from the jurisdiction of the court in a divorce
proceeding by a prior postnuptial agreement of the parties following separation, though the court may adopt as its grant of alimony
the sum fixed by the contract."
c. Limitations as to Contracts Affecting Real Estate
2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.06,126 invalidating any contract between husband and wife relative to the real estate of either, has
by the court's interpretation been construed to perpetuate the
common law rule that a husband could not convey real estate di120. See statute quoted in note 94 supra.
121. (1931) 183 Minn. 306. 307-08, 236 N. W. 455, 456. The court
said: "Among other 'equal rights' conferred upon a wife were . . . the right
to contract as if unmarried, accompanied by the obligation of being bound
by such contracts. She can contract with her husband as to all subjects except
those relating to the real estate of either. Of course, excepted from this rule
are contracts (of which the one here involved is not one) which are void
because against public policy." Ibid. See note 119 supra and text thereto.
122. See (1939) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 979. The specific question of the
validity of such agreements where there has been no separation has not
arisen in Minnesota.
123. Vanderburgh v. Vanderburgh, (1921) 148 Minn. 120, 180 N. W.
999; see Sessions v. Sessions, (1929) 178 Minn. 75, 78, 226 N. W. 211, 212.
124. Hertz v. Hertz, (1917) 136 Minn. 188, 161 N. W. 402. It is to be
noted that as a part of the separation agreement in this case the wife released
her husband ".... forever from any and all claims or demands arising out of
the marriage relation, including her statutory rights in his estate should she
survive him." Id. at 189, 161. N. W. at 402. The question of the validity of this
was not raised. See note 128 infra and text thereto.
125. Sessions v. Sessions, (1929) 178 Minn. 75. 226 N. W. 211, modified
on rearg., (1929) 178 Minn. 79, 226 N. W. 701.
126. See statute quoted in note 94 supra.
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rectly to his wife.'- The Minnesota court has construed strictly the
language of that statute on the theory that if a result different from
what the plain language of the statute commands is desirable it is
a problem for the legislature, so that where only a portion of an
otherwise valid separation agreement concerned itself with a binding obligation between husband and wife relative to the conveyance
of real estate, the entire contract was held invalid. 128
Though the statute may be troublesome, its effect is circumvented by conveyances through third parties, which are held
valid when once executed even though made in pursuance of a
previously made and invalid agreement between husband and wife
2 9
for such a conveyance.1

IV. TORTS
A. At Common Law
At common law neither spouse could sue the other for torts committed against person or property."30 This resulted from the fact
that the wife could not sue anyone without her husband's consent
and joinder-to permit the action would require joining the husband with the wife as plaintiff to sue the husband as defendant."'3
A suit by a wife against her husband would have made the husband
liable to himself in damages, since the husband was both liable
for the torts committed by his wife before and after their marriage
and was entitled to her choses in action.32 Suit by the wife for an

127. See note 94 supra. The language of the statute specifically prohibits
only contracts between husband and wife relative to the real estate of either
and makes no mention of conveyances, but the court in its early decisions
assumed without much discussion that conveyances were thereby prohibited.
See (1929) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 612 on this point and on the effect of modern
statutes in general on the validity of conveyances of real property directly
between husband and wife.
128. Simmer v. Simmer, Jr., (1935) 195 Minn. 1, 261 N. W. 481. The
court there said: "The statute invalidates a contract of any kind between husband and wife in respect to the real estate of either. That intention could not be
made plainer. Husband and wife are forbidden to enter into any executory agreement with each other to join in future conveyances ....
The intention that
neither shall give the other, by agreement between the two, any interest in
or control over real estate could not be made plainer than by the express
prohibition that neither shall give to the other 'any power of attorney or
other authority
*-t to convey real estate or any interest therein.' " Id.
at 4,261 N. W. at 482.
129. Jorgenson v. Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co., (1896) 64 Minn.
489, 67 N. W. 364.
130. See Madden. Persons and Domestic Relations (1931) 220. For a
necessary modification of this statement with respect to the doctrine of the
wife's separate estate which developed in equity, see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1035.
131. See Madden, op. cit. supra note 130, at 22-0. See text to note 8 supra.
132. See Harper, Torts (1933) 632.
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antenuptial tort of the husband was also barred, 13 and subsequent
divorce did not remove the disability of the wife to sue for a tort
committed during coverture." 4
In suits for torts committed against third parties by the wife
before marriage, though the duty was substantively the wife's,
action had to be brought against the husband and wife jointly, and
judgment could be enforced against the property of either, but the
action existed against the wife individually if she survived her
husband.13 5 The husband was at common law liable for all torts
committed by his wife during coverture, and she was also liable
in general, except when she acted in his presence and at his
command. 3 6
For a tort committed by a third party against the wife, the wife
could not sue without being joined by her husband,'137 except as
9
to torts committed against her separate equitable property."
B. Under Minnesota Law
1. Inter Se
a. Liability of Spouse
The section of the Married Women's Act establishing the wife's
separate legal existence'3 9 does not in terms deal with the question of liability for torts inter se, but its language is broad enough
to permit the court to have construed the statute as abrogating the
common law with respect to suits between husband and wife for
torts inter se. While the Minnesota court has held this section to
preserve the married woman's legal identity to the extent that she
may enforce against her husband any right affecting her separate
property, the same as if he were a stranger,' 40 thus adopting the
majority rule with respect to torts by the husband affecting the
133. See Prosser, Torts (1941) 899.
134. Strom v. Strom, (1906) 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 104;. It should
be noted that dissolution by divorce was not possible prior to the English

Reformation.

135. See 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (4th ed. 1935) 531.
136. See Madden, op. cit. supra note 130, §§ 64. 65. The earlier common law raised a rebuttable presumption of coercion on the part of the husband where the wife's tort was committed in his presence, and thereby made
him personally liable unless the presumption was rebutted. Id. at 209.
137. Id. at 158-9. The husband got all elements of damages in such
action. Id. at 159, 162. He, of course, got all the damages in his separate
action against the tortfeasor "per quod consortium amisit." Id. at 161.
13. Id. at 157.
139. 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.01. See statute quoted in note 18 supra.
140. Gillespie v. Gillespie, (1896) 64 Minn. 381, 67 N. W. 206.
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wife's separate property, 41 it has steadfastly refused to permit an
action between spouses for personal torts in a clear line of cases
which indicates that the court is unlikely to change its attitude
42
before there has been a statutory change.' '
The statute was first construed in Strom v. Strom 43 where it
was held that ah action for an assault upon the wife committed
during coverture could not be brought even after divorce, on the
reasoning that the statute was meant to give the wife the same rights
of action in her own name as the husband had and no other or
greater right, and that he never had the substantive right to sue
his wife for personal tort.
The case was followed in Drake v. Drake44 where the court
refused an injunction against interference and annoyance with
plaintiff-husband's business and private affairs and pointed out
that it would not open up a field of litigation which was likely
to disturb the tranquillity of the home14 5 without direct legislative
enactment, particularly when the divorce courts are open for
redress in a proper case and when the criminal law exists.
The decision in the case of Woltman v. Woltman 4 6 provided
further evidence that the Minnesota court considered non-liability
for personal torts between husband and wife a closed question in
Minnesota. The court recognized that there were varying rules
in other jurisdictions, but held that the question was no longer
open in Minnesota in view of the decisions in the Strom and Drake
141. For a discussion of the majority and minority viewpoints taken on
this question see (1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 595; (1926) 11 Minn. L. Rev. 79;
(1917) 1 Minn. L. Rev. 82.
142. Karalis v. Karalis, (1942) 213 Minn. 31, 4 N. V. 2d 632; Kyle v.
Kyle. (1941) 210 Minn. 204, 297 N. W. 744; Patenaude v. Patenaude, (1935)
195 Minn. 523, 263 N. XV. 546; Woltman v. Woltman, (1922) 153 Minn. 217,
189 N. IV. 1022; Drake v. Drake, (1920) 145 Minn. 388, 177 N. W. 624;
Strom v. Strom, (1906)Y 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. IV. 1047, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.)
191 and note.
143. (1906) 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 191
and note.
144. (1920) 145 Minn. 388, 177 N. W. 624, 4 Minn. L. Rev. 538. See
a discussion of the case in McCurdy, supra note 130, at 1045.
145. ".... the welfare of the home, the abiding place of domestic love and
affection, the maintenance of which in all its sacredness, undisturbed by a
public exposure of trivial family disagreements is so essential to society, demands and requires that no new grounds for its disturbance or disruption by
judicial proceedings be engrafted on the law by rule of court not sanctioned
or made necessary by express legislation." Drake v. Drake, (1920) 145
Minn. 388, 391, 177 N. W. 624, 625.
This reasoning has been criticized on the ground that in these cases there
is very little domestic peace to be preserved. McCurdy, supra note 130, at 1052.
146. (1922) 153 Minn. 217, 189 N. W. 1022.
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thoroughly considered and deliberately de-

Patenaudev. Patenaudel "'s extended the doctrine so as to preclude suits between spouses for torts committed prior to marriage,
on the reasoning that if Section 519.01 meant to change the common law, it would have done so whether the wrong was committed before or after marriage and, the court having previously
held that there was no change with respect to torts during coverture,
no change with respect to torts before marriage would be implied. 4
The rule was again recognized and applied so as to deny the
wife recovery against a partnership for negligence committed
against her by her husband, one of the partners, while he was
operating a partnership automobile with the consent of his part1 50
ners.
The clinching evidence that the Minnesota court considers the
policy of not permitting an action between spouses for personal
tort to be firmly established is Kyle v. Kyle,' 5 ' a fairly recent conflict of laws case. The court felt constrained to hold that to permit
an action for personal tort between the spouses would contravene
the settled public policy of the state, even though such an action was
maintainable in the state of the injury.
Some indication that the court is not overly pleased with this
rule, though it undoubtedly considers it fixed, was its willingness to
make a distinction in the case of Albrecht v. Potthoff,152 in order
to take that case out of the rule. That was an action by the administrator of the estate of a decedent against the husband of the
sole beneficiary entitled to the proceeds of such action. The court
permitted recovery on the bases that this was not an action by a wife
against her husband, it being brought by the administrator, and that
the tort was against a third person, not the spouse. A well reasoned dissent by Ar. justice Stone argues plausibly that since the
147. Id. at 218, 189 N. W. at 1022.
148. (1935) 195 Minn. 523, 263 N. W. 546, (1936) 20 Minn. L. Rev.
227.

149. Here again, the court emphasized domestic tranquillity as a consideration of public policy saying, "Quite generally, one of the reasons why
a husband or wife cannot bring suit for a personal tort against the other,
during coverture at least, is that to do so would disturb and tend to disrupt
the marriage and family relations, which it is the public policy of the state
to protect and maintain inviolable." Id. at 526, 263 N. W. at 547-48.
150. Karalis v. Karalis, (1942) 213 Minn. 31, 4 N. V. 2d 632.
151. (1941) 210 Minn. 204, 297 N. W. 744, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 944.
152. (1934) 192 Minn. 557, 257 N. W. 377, (1935) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 595.
The writer there suggests that recovery might have been sustained as involving a property right of the wife. Id. at 596.
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wife was the sole beneficiary, it was in effect an action between
husband and wife. However, the court here expressly states that
this case is one which is not within the rule and does not represent
a departure therefrom. 5 3
The only overt criticism of the rule of the Strom case to come
from any member of the Minnesota court is to be found in Mr.
Justice Hilton's dissent, concurred in by Mr. justice Peterson, in
the case of Kyle v. Kyle.1 4 He argues that the court in its subsequent decisions has ignored the broad language of Mr. Justice
Mitchell in the early case of Gillespie v.. Gillespie,1" where he interpreted the purpose of the Married Women's Act to be:
"... to preserve the separate legal existence of a married woman
in respect to all her rights of person and property, and, to the extent necessary to the full exercise and protection of these rights, to
give her in her own name all the remedies in the courts which she
would have if unmarried."
b. Liability of Spotse's Principal
In a considered opinion which reviewed the existing split of
authority in other jurisdictions on the question of whether a
spouse's principal could be liable to an injured person where the
spouse guilty of the tort was immune because of the marriage relationship, the Minnesota court, in the case of liller v. J. A. Tyrholin & Co.,'" held that the immunity of the husband from suit
in tort on the part of his wife would not inure to the benefit of the
husband's principal. The argument of the contra position, that permitting such a recovery is pointless since generally the principal
can recover from the agent spouse, was considered by the court but
dismissed. The court chose instead to adopt what it considered the
growing and modern view, basing its holding on the reasoning that
the act does not lose its unlawful character by virtue of the
immunity of the actor and that there is no public policy in favor
of extending the husband's immunity to make his principal
57
immune."
153.

Albrecht v. Potthoff, (1934) 192 Minn. 557, 561, 257 N. W. 377,

378. In a later case the court again pointed out that the Albrecht case was not
to he construed as changing the rule. Karalis v. Karalis, (1942) 213 Minn.
31, 33, 4 N. W. 2d 632, 633. See text to note 150 supra.

154. (1941) 210 Minn. 204, 208-13, 297 N. W. 744, 746-49.
155. (1896) 64 Minn. 381, 383, 67 N. W. 206, 207. See note 140 supra
and text thereto.
156. (1936) 196 Minn. 438, 265 N. W. 324, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 566.
157. For a discussion of the majority and minority positions see (1936)
20 Minn. L. Rev. 566; (1933) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 450; (1930) 14 Minn. L.

Rev. 574; (1925) 9 Minn. L. Rev. 485.
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In Karalis v. Karalis,15 however, the court held a partnership
not liable for the tort of one of its members to that member's wife
committed under circumstances where liability would have existed
had the husband-wife relationship not been present, and distinguished the Miller case on the ground that there a corporation
was the principal. Though logically there should be no distinction
on the basis of whether the principal is a partnership or a corporation, the Karalis case can be justified under the wording of the
applicable statute relating to the liability of members of a partner59
ship.
2. Against Third Parties
The husband's liability for the torts of his wife against third
parties is governed expressly by 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, §§ 519.03,
519.05, the language of which is clearly broad enough to abrogate
the husband's common law liability for such torts1 0° Accordingly,
the court in Plasch v. Fass'6 ' construed Section 519.05 as having
abolished the common law liability of a husband for the tort of his
wife against a third party but not as precluding such liability as may
1 62
arise from a valid agency relationship.
3
had
The court in the earlier case of Pett-Morganv. Keinedf,1
519.01,64
§
1945,
Stat.
Minn.
2
now
refused to infer from what is
that the common law liability of a husband for his wife's tort had
been abrogated, but that conclusion was unavoidable under the then
existing provision in 2 Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 5536, reading:

"Nothing in this act shall be construed . . . to exempt a
(1942) 213 Minn. 31, 4 N. W. 2d 632.
159. 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 323.12, under which the case was decided,
158.

reads in part, ".

.

. the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as

the partner so acting or omitting to act."
160. Section 519.03 reads in part: "Every married woman is bound by
her contracts and responsible for her torts, and her property shall be liable
for her debts and torts to the same extent as if unmarried." Section 519.05
reads in part: ". . . nor shall any married man be liable for any torts, debts,

or contracts of his wife, committed or entered into either before or during
coverture, except for necessaries furnished to the wife after marriage, where
he would be liable at common law."
161. (1919) 144 Minn.44, 174 N. W. 438; see (1920) 4 Minn.L. Rev.
73, 74.
162. In this connection it should be noted that the marriage relation-

ship between driver and guest, as a matter of law, does not constitute the
driver the agent of the guest. Olson v. Kennedy Trading Co., (1937) 199
Minn. 493, 272 N. W. 381; see Christensen v. Hennepin Transportation Co.,
(1943) 215 Minn. 394, 404, 10 N. W. 2d 406, 413.
163. (1895) 62 Minn. 348, 64 N. W. 912, 30 L. R. A. 521 and note.
164. See statute quoted in note 18 supra.

NOTES
husband from liabilities for torts committed by his wife."'' 5
Bracil v. Moran,"6 decided prior to the controlling legislative
enactments, was simply declaratory of the common law rule that
a wife is not liable for a tort committed by her in the presence of
her husband when the presumption of coercion by him is not
rebutted.
3. By Third Party Against a Spouse
As a result of the married woman's newly created status making her responsible for her torts, the important reciprocal question
arises as to whether she alone can recover, without joining her
husband as plaintiff, for all items of damage resulting from a tort
committed against her by a third party. 2 Minn. Stat. 1945,
§ 540.05,17 clearly abrogates the common law requirement of
joinder of the husband in a suit by the wife. 2 Minn. Stat. 1945,
§§ 519.01, 519.02,""; would seem to give the wife such choses in
action. However, to the extent that the loss resulting from a tort
against the wife is a loss to the husband, for example, a loss of his
wife's services, the question remains one of judicial interpretation
as to how far the general tenor of the Married Women's Act impliedly entitles only the wife to recover for all the elements of
damage.'""
The present, incomplete law on this subject has grown
by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. Ordinarily,
the injured wife cannot recover
for medical expenses
70
because her husband is obliged to provide them for her'
and the court has permitted the husband an action to recover for
the loss of the society and services of his wife and for expenses in
effecting her cure.' 7 ' Where, however, the wife assumed the liability
for, and paid for, her own medical expenses, it was held in
Fink v. Baer' that she might recover that element of damages. The
165. A legislative change was made in Minn. Laws 1897, c. 10, which
cpecifically exempted the husband from liability for his wife's torts, now 2
Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.05, and struck the provision which had retained the
husband's liability from 2 Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 5536, now 2 Minn. Stat.
1945, § 519.08.
166. (1863) 8 Minn. 236, 83 Am. Dec. 772 and note.
167. See statute quoted in note 23 supra.
168. See statutes quoted in notes 18, 65 supra.
169. The common law position is discussed in note 137 supra.
170. See Belyea v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. 1. Ry., (1895) 61 Minn.
224, 63 N. W. 627.
171. McDevitt v. City of St. Paul, (1896) 66 Minn. 14, 68 N. W. 178;
Skoglund v. Minneapolis Street Ry., (1891) 45 Minn. 330, 47 N. W. 1071.
It does not appear from the reports that the wife brought any action against
the defendant.
172. (1930) 180 Minn. 433, 230 N. W. 888.
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Fink case was followed and extended in Paulos v. Koclsch,'"' where
the wife suing for injuries had not lived with nor been supported
by her husband for five years. She was permitted, as against the
defense that the husband alone was liable for such sums, to recover hospital and medical expenses, on the rationale that she
alone had requested the services and had thereby bound herself to
pay for them under 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 519.03. The court there
pointed out that no injustice existed in permitting such recovery
by the wife, since recovery by her 7would bar any subsequent action
by the husband for such damages.1 1
It is thus apparent that in Minnesota there are still two distinct
causes of action arising from a tort against a married woman.
one in her for the direct injury to her person,' 7 ' and the other in
her husband for the consequential injuries to him from loss of her
services and society and the expenses to which he has been put.'-,"
The related questions as to whether one spouse can recover from
a third party for criminal conversation with, or alienation of affections of the other spouse, are discussed in (1923) 7 Minn. L. Rev.
428 and (1921) 6 Minn. L. Rev. 76.
The wife's ability to recover for torts to her separate property
by third persons is considered above under Section II. PROPERTY.
V. CRIMES

A. At Common Law
With respect to the criminal law, considerations of social necessity dictated that the common law fiction of legal martial unity be
halted short of its logical application, so that even at common law
the husband and wife were criminally liable for offenses inter se.
77
such as murder, manslaughter, mayhem, and aggravated assault .
The line was drawn in general so that the husband or wife was
criminally liable for criminal acts committed against the other's
person, but was not so liable for crimes against the other's prop173. (1935) 195 Minn. 603, 263 N. 1V. 913.
174. Id. at 608, 263 N. W. at 915.
175. Libaire v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., (1911) 113 'Minn. 517, 130
N. W. 8.
176. Mageau v. Great Northern Ry., (1908) 103 -Minn.290, 115 N. W.
651. For a discussion of the husband's right to the wife's services see (1932)
16 Minn. L. Rev. 443.
177. See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws (1935) 162. Rape, however, was not among the crimes for which a husband could be guilty as a
principal in the first degree since he had a legal right to sexual intercourse
with his wife. Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations (1931) 227. He
might be guilty as a second degree principal, or as an accessory, if he aided
and abetted another man in raping her. Ibid.
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erty.Y7 It was an essential element of most of the latter crimes that
there be an invasion of the possession of "another," and the common law notion effectively precluded showing the wife's individual
identity,1
" 7 except as to her separate Estate in equity.180 Thus, for
example, at common law neither spouse was guilty of arson for
burning the property of the other, 81 nor for larceny of the other's
goods."'

2

A wife was in general criminally liable for criminal acts against
third persons just as if she were a feme sole. 83 However, if the
acts were committed in the presence of her husband, the common
law raised a rebuttable presumption that her acts were not voluntary but rather were due to his coercion, and she was excused while
he was held liable unless there was evidence rebutting the presiun tion."I
B. Under Minnesota Law
1. Criminal Acts Against a Spouse's Person or Property
The position of the Ainnesota court on the question of criminal
liability for acts by one spouse against the other or against the
other's property is not nearly so well settled as the analogous question with respect to torts. Cases have not arisen involving criminal
acts against the person, but the public purpose embodied in the
Married Women's Act would certainly require that no change be
made from the general common law rule which held the spouse
liable for a criminal act against the other's person.
On the question of the spouse's liability for criminal acts against
the other's property, the court has held in State v. Arnold'8 5 that a
wife could not be guilty of larceny of her husband's property under
a larceny statute making "every person" liable. The court reasoned
178. See Afadden, op. cit. supra note 177, § 70.
179. Id. at 226.
180. See note 63 supra.
181. See Maddep, op. cit. supra note 177, at 226; 3 Vernier, op. cit.
supra note 177, at 162.
182. See Madden, op. cit. supra note 177, at 226; 3 Vernier, op. cit. supra
note 177, at 163.
183. See Madden, op. cit. supra note 177, at 216.
184. Id. at 216-17. Murder and treason appear to have been recognized
exceptions to the rule from its inception. Id. at 217.
185. (1931) 182 -Minn. 313, 235 N. W. 373, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 589. The
decision has become a leading case and has drawn a considerable amount
of comment and criticism. Position criticized in Note, (1940) 25 Iowa L.
Rev. 351, 356-60; discussed in Note, (1941) 16 St. John's L. Rev. 78, 82-83.
The latter note argues plausibly that the best rationale of the majority
position as expressed in the Arnold case is that the criminal act is really
against the state and not against the "star" witness, and that penal laws
should be written in clear and unmistakable language. Ibid.
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that the Married Women's Act did not change the marriage status
but affected only property and contract rights, and that a new crime
could be created only by express legislative enactment. 8 6 The
187
court made no mention of its earlier decision in State v. Roth,
where it was held that it was arson for a husband to burn property
owned jointly by himself and his wife. In the Roth case, the court's
holding was put on the broad ground that the statutes creating
the married woman's individual property rights made it necessary
to say that the property was that of another person within the
meaning of the arson statute.
In the subsequent case of State v. Zemplels8 the court followed
the Roth case in again holding that the rule providing that a husband could not be guilty of arson for the burning of a dwelling
house owned by his wife, when it is their joint abode, does not
obtain in Minnesota. The court there pointed out an alternative
basis for the decision in the arson cases under the arson statute'5 0
which made a person guilty of arson for the wilful burning of even
his own property. The decision in the Arnold case was considered
by the court but apparently limited to larceny.
From the decisions in these few cases, it is apparent that the
particular wording of the statute defining the crime in each case has
had and will likely continue to have an important bearing on the
direction which the decisions will take.
2. Criminal Acts by the Wife Against Third Persons
The common law defense given the married woman iy raising
a rebuttable presumption of coercion by her husband as to criminal
acts committed by her against third persons in his presence is specifically abrogated by statute in Minnesota. 9 0 Apparently no cases
have as yet construed the statute but the intent would fairly admit
of no other construction. The married woman today would be liable
for her crimes as though she were sole. 9'
186. The decision was by a divided court, justices Holt and Hilton
dissenting.
187. (1912) 117 Minn. 404, 136 N. V. 12.

188.

(1936) 196 Minn. 159, 264 N. -V. 587.

189. The statute, now 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 621.06, reads: "To constitute arson, it shall not be necessary that another person than the defendant
should have had ownership in the building set on fire."
190. 2 Minn. Stat. 1945, § 610.06. "It is no defense for a married wonlan
charged with crime that the alleged act was committed by her in the presence
of her husband."
191. The related question of the admissibility of testimony by one
spouse for or against another in cases of criminal acts against third parties
is considered under Section I. SEPARATE LEGAL EXISTENCE. See note 32
supra and text thereto.
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NOTES
CONCLUSIONS

It is apparent that most of the legal disabilities which inhered
in the status of a married woman under the common law concept of
the unity of husband and wife have been swept away in Minnesota
by legislation and by the decisions of the court rendered in applying
and construing that legislation. It is submitted that this result is quite
proper in that it represents a reasonable adaptation to the type of
society we have developed. Because of the advances made in our
technology and because of the changed attitudes we have towards
the proper place of the married woman in society, her need for the
same legal capacities which her husband enjoys has become increasingly apparent. However, it cannot sensibly be maintained
that complete "equality" or sameness in the legal capacities of a
husband and a wife could or should be achieved, since certain inherent differences in the economic capacities of the husband and
of the wife do exist. For example, though today it is becoming common for a married woman to be employed and thus to contribute
to the family income, her ability to do so is restricted to an extent
by her child-bearing function, to mention only the most obvious
limitation. Nor can it be argued that the married woman should
necessarily have in all respects the same legal status as has a single
woman, since marriage creates a status tp which the law justly attaches certain legal incidents. Thus, for example, a given act by a
man which might constitute a tort against a single woman might
not constitute a tort against his wife on the ground that there is a
larger implied consent between married persons, in jurisdictions
where suits for torts inter se are recognized. It is to be noted, however, that this difference goes to what constitutes the substantive
nature of the tort and not to any procedural difference due to the
status which a woman acquires on marriage.
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that our legislature
and our court have gone as far as they ought towards granting the
married woman in Minnesota the same legal capacities which her
husband enjoys. It is submitted, for example, that the better view
would be to hold the husband and the wife liable for torts inter se,
subject to the substantive limitation mentioned above which would
give rise to a broader implied consent, particularly in view of the
fact that, as we have seen above, our court holds that a spouse can
recover from the other spouse's principal for a tort against him
committed by the other spouse as agent. The argument that to
permit such a recovery would destroy marital peace and harmony
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is, on analysis, unsound if common sense notice is taken of the fact
that normally no such suit would be brought where any peace and
harmony exists, except in cases where the ultimate recovery would
be had against an insurance company or some other third party.
Similarly, the prohibition against a conveyance of any interest in
real estate directly between a husband and wife, which our court
has construed the language of our statute to contain, is an
anachronism which has no place in our law, since as appears above,
our court has held that such a conveyance is permitted if made
through a third party.
In view of the large extent to which the married woman in
Minnesota has acquired new legal capacity, the question might
properly be raised as to whether she ought not to be required to
assume corresponding duties, paralleling those of the husband. For
example, as noted above, though the rights of creditors are protected
to the extent that the married woman is made jointly liable with her
husband for necessaries, the wife can still recover the sums she expended from the husband where it appears that she intended to get
the money back. An interesting conflict could conceivably arise
from the co-existing facts that a husband is still entitled to his wife's
ordinary household services, and that on the other hand the wife
is entitled to the fruits and avails of her labor or business. If a wife
desired to be gainfully employed to the exclusion of performing her
household duties, could her husband insist that she perform her
household duties personally? If not, and she insisted on working, could he require her to pay a portion of the household expenses in lieu of her personal rendition of the ordinary household services? These questions are unanswered by any express
statutory language or by judicial decision, probably because
such a situation is normally worked out more or less amicably
between husband and wife, but they suggest that possibly
the wife ought to be liable proportionally for the support of the
family where she is gainfully employed.
Though it may fairly be said that the common law concept of
the unity of husband and wife has ceased to be of controlling importance in most practical respects in Minnesota, yet it cannot
be said that the concept is dead. The foregoing demonstrates the
extent to which the court has adapted the common law to the legislative changes, basic in nature, which have been made in the
husband-wife relationship by the Married Women's Act and related statutes.

